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The Discovery of Truth in Context 
COMMENTS ON FAIGMAN, KATSKEE, AND KEIL 
Sam Glucksberg† 
 Truth is hard to come by, even in optimal circumstances 
where the criteria are explicit and clear, and where it can be 
objectively established whether those criteria have been met 
(at least in principle). Consider baseball. When a batter does 
not swing at the ball, the umpire must make the call. Is it a 
strike or a ball? The criteria are explicit: the ball must be 
within the strike zone. The batter knows this, the pitcher 
knows this, the fans know this, and the umpire, of course, also 
knows this. The criteria are clear. In principle, one could have 
the decision made by machine, as it is often done in tennis. 
Despite the empirical clarity and explicit decision rules, there 
are still three ways of construing the truth every time the 
umpire makes the call. The first might be called objective 
realism: when queried, an umpire who is committed to this 
position would say, “I call them as they are.” The second, 
subjective realism: “I call them as I see them.” The third, what 
might be called declarative realism: asserted by one of the 
greatest umpires of his time, Bill Klem, “It ain’t nothin’ till I 
call it.”1 
From my layperson’s point of view, many judicial 
decisions, even those informed by scientific realism, seem to be 
somewhat akin to Klem’s decisions. They are constrained by 
the relevant criteria and by the “objective” facts, yet they 
ultimately depend on human judgment. A case that comes to 
  
 † Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Princeton University. 
 1  See GEORGE SULLIVAN & BARBARA LAGOWSKI, THE SPORTS CURMUDGEON 
164 (1993). 
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mind is a decision by the International Court of Justice. That 
court decided that the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at 
Srebrenica in 1995 was an act of genocide, but that Serbia 
itself was not guilty of the crime2. Judicial decisions such as 
this constitute a particular type of speech act. According to the 
philosopher of language, John Searle, there are roughly five 
kinds of speech acts: assertives, whereby we describe a state of 
the world such as “today is Friday”; directives, where we 
request something, such as “could you please hand me a glass 
of water”; commissives, whereby we commit ourselves to some 
course of action, such as “I’ll have chicken tonight”; expressives, 
whereby we tell people how we feel about something, such as “I 
really enjoyed today’s sessions”; and, most relevant to this 
discussion, declarations, whereby we accomplish something 
merely by saying something.3 Bill Klem’s shouting “Steerike!” 
defined that pitch as a strike, just as the International Court of 
Justice’s declaration that genocide had occurred did not simply 
label an act, but also defined the 1995 massacre as an act of 
genocide. 
These two examples illustrate not only the nature of 
declaratives, but also that most speech acts accomplish more 
than one thing at a time. In these examples of calling a strike 
and declaring an act of genocide, the speakers are not only 
describing a state of the world but characterizing those states. 
Calling a strike creates a strike and purports to describe a 
state of the world—the ball is asserted to have been in the 
strike zone. Declaring an act of genocide not only creates a new 
act of genocide, but also asserts that the act did in fact violate 
the United Nations Convention on Genocide.  
I do not know if Professor David Faigman would agree, 
but it seems to me that the concept of scientific realism4 and 
issues of factual “truth” share some of the properties of these 
examples. Scientific realism is the assumption that there is a 
real world independent of our minds that can be studied 
scientifically. At the very least, the notion of scientific truth 
should encompass not just fact finding, but also fact creation—
not just asserting, but declaring that an act meets the criteria 
  
 2 Marlise Simons, Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007. 
 3 JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF 
SPEECH ACTS 12-20 (1979). 
 4  For elaboration of this concept, see generally David L. Faigman, Scientific 
Realism in Constitutional Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1067 (2008) (this volume).  
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for, say, genocide. This not only declares that a particular act 
meets those criteria, but also creates a new member of that 
category of acts.5 
Faigman’s discussion of scientific realism and the place 
of facts in the context of constitutional interpretation reminds 
me of the debates in economics concerning another kind of 
realism, “behavioral realism.” Behavioral realism refers to the 
use of scientific knowledge about people to evaluate assump-
tions (often unfounded) about human nature. The work of such 
scholars as Amos Tversky, Danny Kahneman, and Richard 
Thaler,6 among many others, raises important challenges to  
the concept of “rational man,” culminating only recently in the 
establishment of behavioral economics as a recognized disci-
pline.7 While by no means universally accepted, more and more 
economists are recognizing the relevance of behavioral and 
social science findings to economic theory and practice. Again, 
from my layperson’s perspective, scientific realism seems to  
be a necessity not only in economics but also in legal interpre-
tation, especially in those contexts where abstract concepts 
such as equality and liberty must be instantiated anew as time 
passes and the world changes.  
From a psychological/behavioral standpoint, people’s 
understandings of abstract concepts are rarely, if ever, explicit. 
Instead, such concepts can be inferred by examining how they 
are instantiated in a given context. As Faigman clearly points 
out, as times and circumstances change, people’s constructions 
of concepts such as segregation also change. The notion that 
segregation is inherently unequal provides a good example of 
unanticipated instantiation. Consider the problem of warring 
gangs in prisons: when gang members are assigned cell blocks 
on the basis of their race or ethnicity, is this an instance of 
“segregation”? Just as declaring that the murder of Bosnian 
Muslims was genocide, declaring that the concept of segrega-
tion is or is not applicable to the gang situation instantiates 
that concept in a new way. The transcendent concepts listed by 
  
 5 For elaboration of this view, see generally Richard B. Katskee, Science, 
Intersubjective Validity, and Judicial Legitimacy, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 857 (2008) (this 
volume). 
 6 See, e.g., AMOS TVERSKY, PREFERENCE, BELIEF, AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED 
WRITINGS (Eldar Shafir ed., 2004). 
 7 Also culminating in a Nobel Prize in economics to Kahneman for his work 
with Tversky on heuristics and biases in decision-making under uncertainty. Daniel 
Altman, A Nobel That Bridges Economics and Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002,  
at C1. 
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Faigman, such as free speech, free exercise of religion, equal 
protection, and due process, may well be eternal truths, but 
those truths must necessarily be instantiated in concrete cases 
as people decide whether situation X is a case of free speech or 
due process or equal protection. Declaring or not declaring it so 
is analogous to calling a ball or a strike; in a very real sense, 
saying so makes it so. And because our world is dynamic and 
changing, such decisions must always be made anew (Justice 
Thomas notwithstanding). In short, Faigman’s arguments are 
remarkably consistent with what we know in cognitive science 
about the nature of human concept learning, concept structure, 
and concept instantiation and application.  
Because general concepts must be instantiated anew 
with every new context, there is ample opportunity for biases to 
shape and color each new instantiation. Faigman’s analysis of 
biases in social science research is consistent with what we 
know of bias effects and how we try to minimize them. The 
opportunities for biases to affect the selection of problems, the 
definition of the subjects of study, determination of what to 
conclude, discriminating between fact and value, and 
assessment of the validity and applicability of evidence are 
virtually endless. The first step to minimize bias is to explicitly 
recognize that there is a distinction between fact and value. 
Further, and not incidentally, this requires explicit adherence 
to the proposition that there is a real world, independent of our 
minds, and that we can discover facts about that world. Then, 
as in all sciences, we must do what we can to minimize bias in 
every phase of our work. For example, in both behavioral and 
medical research, we employ double blind studies to minimize 
both observer and participant bias effects. We use placebos in 
medical research to isolate the effects of expectations from the 
effects of the treatment under investigation. As Faigman 
observes, even the “hard” sciences such as physics recognize 
the interactive effects of observer, observer position, and the 
phenomena under study.8 I agree with his analyses and 
concerns, and with his conclusion: “Adhering to the scientific 
method . . . perhaps provides only a limited, and not entirely 
satisfying, check on [the effects] of researchers’ biases. But, 
however imperfect the process might be, the benefits of 
scientific social inquiry are worth the effort.”9 
  
 8 Faigman, supra note 4, at 1089-90. 
 9 Id. at 1091. 
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Faigman points out that all scientists, not just social 
scientists, are subject to the biases that might be generated 
from one or another normative positions.10 But I am not 
convinced that “a natural scientist’s inquiry tends to be less 
inherently value-laden.”11 For starters, all scientists usually 
start off with a favored hypothesis, and natural scientists’ 
commitments to their pet theories are no less strongly held 
than those of social scientists. When a hypothesis is firmly 
held, it makes not a whit of difference if the science is physical 
or social: observer error driven by bias must always be 
minimized by following appropriate procedures. A prime 
example is provided by Alfred Binet in his efforts to determine 
if intelligence is related to brain size. Binet firmly believed that 
children with larger brains were more successful in school than 
those with smaller brains, and his measurements of skull size 
(as a surrogate variable for brain size) seemed to confirm his 
hypothesis. As quoted by Stephen Jay Gould, Binet could not 
be more sure: “The relationship between the intelligence of 
subjects and the volume of their head . . . is very real and has 
been confirmed by all methodical investigators, without 
exception . . . we conclude that the . . . [correlation between 
head size and intelligence] must be considered as incon-
testable.”12 But he was too good a scientist to accept his first 
findings and conclusions. Two years later, he wrote: 
I feared that in making measurements on heads with the intention of 
finding a difference in volume between an intelligent and a less 
intelligent head, I would be led to increase, unconsciously and in 
good faith, the cephalic volume of intelligent heads and to decrease 
that of unintelligent heads. 
. . . . 
Suggestibility . . . works less on an act of which we have full 
consciousness, than on a half-conscious act—and this is precisely its 
danger.13 
Note that skull measurement can serve either natural or social 
science purposes. If one’s hypothesis concerns the relation 
between skull size and brain maturation, then it may qualify 
  
 10  Id. at 1082. 
 11 Id. 
 12 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 176 (1996) (quoting A. 
Binet, Historique des Recherches sur les Rapports de l’Intelligence avec la Grandeur et 
la Forme de la Tête. 5 L’ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 245, 294-95 (1898)). 
 13 Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (quoting A. Binet, Recherches sur la Technique 
de la Mensuration de la Tête Vivante, 7 L’ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 314, 323-24 (1900)). 
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as natural science. If the relation is between skull size and 
social skills, then it may qualify as social science. The 
opportunity for bias in measurement and for drawing 
conclusions is not inherently different in these two cases.14 One 
need only turn to the controversy involving evolution and 
creationism to find another clash of values affecting data 
interpretation in a natural science. Fortunately, both natural 
and social science provide methodological safeguards to 
minimize bias in every phase of the scientific enterprise, from 
problem selection to measurement to drawing inferences and 
implications from data. 
Parallel to the effects of bias in scientific research, 
Faigman makes a persuasive case for the effects of bias in 
courts’ selection and interpretation of scientific findings to 
justify, or perhaps to rationalize, their decisions.15 The use of 
neurological evidence that the brains of eighteen-year-olds are 
still developing to support a decision to exclude the death 
penalty for people eighteen or younger is a case in point.16 But 
if the continuing development of the brain is the definitive 
factor, then twenty-five-year-olds should also be spared. But of 
course, scientific evidence is not the only factor to be taken into 
account. Surely there is a place for community standards, 
values, and ethics, in addition to facts, in legal decision-
making. Distinguishing between fact and value does not 
necessarily mean that we should, or even can, exclude value as 
an important factor. But it is important to explicitly recognize 
the use of values and not pretend that it’s “just the facts” that 
drive judicial decisions. 
Professor Lawrence Solan provides revealing examples 
of how judges interpret language to serve their individual, 
value-driven positions on constitutional law.17 One of the most 
striking examples is the interpretation of the word “use” in the 
context of illegal drug transactions. Prison sentences for those 
convicted of drug offenses are often longer if a gun was “used” 
during a drug transaction. In one case, a convicted person 
appealed his sentence by claiming that his “use” of a gun did 
  
 14 Still, there is the lingering intuition that social science is not as “hard” as 
natural science, as reflected in W.H. Auden’s cynical remark, “Thou shalt not commit a 
social science.” W.H. AUDEN, “Under Which Lyre,” reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS 335 
(Edward Mendelson ed., 1991). 
 15 Faigman, supra note 4, at 1084-85. 
 16 See id. at 1086-87. 
 17 See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). 
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not fall under the gun-use sentencing provision because he 
used the gun for barter, offering it in lieu of additional money 
to buy drugs during a sting operation.18 In effect, he did not use 
the gun as a weapon, but as a bargaining instrument. The 
United States Supreme Court in a majority decision ruled that 
the term “use” covered any use of a gun, whether as a weapon 
or not, and declined to interpret “use” in terms of an inferred 
legislators’ intent of use-as-a-weapon.19 I am confident that 
Faigman could cite many such examples, and that he would not 
be surprised by this one. 
On a related issue, Richard Katskee distinguishes 
between revealed truth20 and scientific truth. I think that most 
of us would agree with his characterization that received truth 
and scientific truth are incommensurate. But that does not 
mean that a given individual cannot hold two sets of beliefs: 
one based on religion and the other on science, even when those 
two beliefs are glaringly contradictory. According to biblical 
teaching, the universe was created by God and the earth is at 
most 10,000 years old.21 Young-earth creationists believe this. 
According to contemporary paleontology, though, the earth is 
hundreds of millions of years old, and events can be dated 
using fossil records and various other dating techniques. 
According to a recent Ph.D. dissertation, a species of marine 
reptiles, mosasaurs, vanished at the end of the Cretaceous era 
about 65 million years ago.22 Palentologists believe this. What 
is intriguing about these two beliefs about the age of the earth 
is that one man, Marcus Ross, believes that both are true.23 
Ross is the author of the dissertation on mosasaurs, even 
though he identifies himself as a young-earth creationist. How 
does he reconcile his two completely different sets of beliefs? 
These views can coexist because, as Ross put it, he is 
“separating the different paradigms.”24 
Can people in general separate their religious and 
scientific paradigms, and if they can, will they then rely 
exclusively on the scientific paradigm in the legal and political 
  
 18 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227 (1993).  
 19 Id. at 240-41. 
 20 By “revealed” or “received” truth, I refer to truth given by one or another 
dogma, including religion, that is not subject either to logical or empirical test. 
 21 See Cornelia Dean, Believing Scripture But Playing by Science’s Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007. 
 22 See Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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realm? When it comes to values and strongly held religious 
beliefs, I seriously doubt it; witness the perennial disputes 
about teaching evolution, providing information on sexually 
transmitted diseases, making abortion safe and available, even 
the inclusion of the word “God” in our pledge of allegiance. 
Separation of revealed and scientific truth is relatively easy in 
principle. Separation in practice may well be impossible—and 
for very good reasons. Scientific truth can adjudicate decisions 
on how to implement policies. But the policies themselves often 
stem from values and moral beliefs, and these are, in the end, 
not provided by scientific fact or theory. My guess is that the 
best we can do is recognize the differences between science and 
religion, and try to keep those distinctions in mind when 
evaluating conflicting views in the legal and political realms. 
To whom do we turn when we are in doubt about either 
scientific or religious truths? Professor Frank Keil raises an 
important issue: when do we know that we do not know?25 This 
question is the province of the field of metacognition, the study 
of how we assess what and how we know things. As Keil 
observes, people are not very good at assessing their own states 
of explanatory knowledge.26 A few familiar household examples 
should suffice. What do people know of the operation of 
thermostats? In a study of how to get people to conserve energy 
in heating their homes, people were asked how they used their 
thermostats.27 More than half the people interviewed set their 
thermostat five degrees higher than the temperature they 
really wanted in the belief that the house would heat up faster 
that way. Then, when the house was warm enough, they would 
reset the thermostat to the desired resting level. This 
invariably wasted energy because people rarely noticed when 
the temperature they actually desired had been reached or 
exceeded. In an informal follow-up to that study, I asked 
several people to explain how their toilets worked. Most had 
only the vaguest ideas, mentioning pumps, propellers, suction 
devices and the like. Yet most of us, including the people in 
these studies, feel that we know about thermostats, toilets, and 
other common household devices well enough. Only when our 
  
 25 Frank C. Keil, Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete Knowledge, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2008) (this volume). 
 26 Id. at 1037-41. 
 27 See generally Willet Kempton, Two Theories of Home Heat Control, 10 
COGNITIVE SCI. 75 (1986). 
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knowledge is probed beyond mere surface level is our relative 
state of ignorance exposed.  
Keil astutely points out the relevance of this lack of 
knowledge, and the lack of awareness of that lack of 
knowledge, in legal contexts.28 What is common knowledge to 
experts and to some lay people is certainly not common 
knowledge to everyone. Even more important, what may seem 
like common knowledge to someone could actually have been 
learned very recently, even within the proceedings of a court 
case. Jurors can often learn something in the course of trial 
testimony and then, a few minutes later, be under the 
impression that they had known that “fact” all the time. This is 
a well-known phenomenon in cognitive and social psychology, 
the “hindsight bias.”29 Hindsight bias refers to the tendency of 
people who learn something new that seems commonsensical to 
come to believe, sincerely believe, that they had known it all 
along. This bias may have its roots in early childhood, where 
the analogous phenomenon is observed in a “false belief” 
context. 30 
In this context, a child, say David, is shown a candy box 
and asked, “What’s in it?” David replies, of course, “Candy.” 
The box is then opened, and lo and behold there are crayons, 
not candy, in the box. David is then asked what his friend 
Tommy will think is in the box if he is shown the closed box. 
David’s answer? “Crayons!” This is hindsight attributed to 
another person. And, if we now ask the first child, David, what 
he thought was in the box before it was opened, he says, with 
great confidence, “Crayons!” 
While not so extreme as this example, adults in the 
context of jury deliberations and decision-making will not only 
fall prey to the hindsight bias, believing that X is something 
they knew all along, but also that X is common knowledge, 
something that everyone knows or should know. For example, 
it is not common knowledge that using a racing (shallow) dive 
into a four-foot deep swimming pool can result in traumatic 
spinal cord injury and quadriplegia. This is because the neck 
can flex sharply forward if the diver’s forehead hits the bottom 
  
 28 See generally Keil, supra note 25. 
 29 See generally Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of 
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
 30 See John H. Flavell et al., Development of the Appearance-Reality 
Distinction, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 95 (1983). (The description in the next paragraph 
draws from this study.) 
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and does not slide. The weight of the diver’s body moving down 
and forward can then break the neck and crush cervical 
vertebrae. A steeper dive poses a risk of concussion, but less of 
a risk of traumatic spinal cord injury. I served as an expert 
witness in a case involving such an injury. After an aquatics 
expert had explained the potential risks of shallow racing 
dives, the jury members seemed to understand the mechanics 
of spinal cord injury in that context. After a brief recess, an 
opposing witness testified that it was common knowledge that 
shallow racing dives were dangerous, and so the quadriplegic 
victim knew, or should have known, the potential consequences 
of his (obviously foolhardy) behavior. From the jurors’ nods of 
agreement, it seemed to me that the hindsight bias was at 
work. Now that the jurors knew of the hazard, they felt that  
it was common knowledge and that everyone should know it.  
In cases like this one, expert testimony on the hazards of  
diving and the need for adequate warnings is not enough. Such 
testimony should be supplemented by a description and 
explanation of how the hindsight bias works and how it can 
lead to erroneous beliefs about what is common knowledge and 
what is not. 
Keil nicely points out the hindsight bias in the context 
of how people decide whether or not something is or is not a 
legitimate area of expertise.31 The legal community should be 
aware of these cognitive and metacognitive biases, both in 
terms of what they themselves believe and how these biases 
can affect jurors’ beliefs and decisions. So, not only should 
expert witnesses be able to explain complex phenomena in 
their own fields of expertise to lay people, they should also be 
able to explain relevant cognitive and metacognitive pheno-
mena as well.  
In the end, what are we to make of Bill Klem’s 
declarative realism, that a pitch is nothing—neither a strike 
nor a ball—until the umpire calls it? There is, after all, the 
assumption of scientific realism, which, as Faigman persua-
sively argues, is a necessary assumption. Katskee adds another 
important element concerning one aspect of scientific realism 
in the context of judicial decision-making: the critical 
importance of decisions seeming right and justifiable in the 
public eye, even when such decisions create judicial “truth.”32 
  
 31 Keil, supra note 26, at 1043-45. 
 32  Katskee, supra note 5, at 860-65. 
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Declarative realism, as exemplified by Bill Klem, is constrained 
by scientific realism—the call must appear justified by the 
ball’s perceived trajectory in or out of the strike zone. Similarly, 
judicial decisions, such as the one described by Katskee 
concerning the teaching of intelligent design, are instances of 
declarative realism.33 Nevertheless, like Klem’s calls, they must 
be justifiable by the evidence and arguments presented. More 
important, perhaps, they must be perceived as justifiable by the 
legal community and ultimately by the public. Yes, truth is 
hard to come by, but both the legal and scientific communities 
have evolved principles and procedures to minimize bias and 
integrate declarative truth with scientific and, I daresay, 
judicial realism. 
  
 33  See Katskee, supra note 5, at 873-76. 
